The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that foreign plaintiffs cannot use two landmark civil rights statutes to sue American companies in federal court for allegedly aiding human rights abuses abroad, sharply curtailing decades of international litigation over corporate conduct.
The 6-3 decision in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe reverses a Ninth Circuit ruling that had permitted foreign nationals to bring claims under the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing for the majority, held that federal courts lack constitutional authority to recognize new private causes of action based on these statutes and that neither statute permits secondary liability for aiding and abetting human rights violations.
What Happened
The lawsuit originated with Falun Gong practitioners—members of a religious movement suppressed by China’s government—who alleged they were detained and tortured with assistance from surveillance technology sold by Cisco Systems. The plaintiffs contended that the San Jose-based tech company and its executives knowingly provided networking infrastructure, including components of the “Golden Shield” project, that enabled Chinese authorities to identify and persecute members of the faith.
A federal district court initially dismissed the complaint, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals revived the claims in 2024, ruling that both the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act permitted international claimants to hold American corporations liable for knowingly facilitating violations of customary international law. The Supreme Court granted review and reversed that decision.
Barrett was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. “Today, we close the door that Sosa cracked and hold that courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms,” Barrett wrote, referencing the court’s 2004 precedent in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. She added that the Torture Victim Protection Act “does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability,” regardless of how broadly plaintiffs might interpret its text.
The Reaction
The three liberal justices issued vigorous dissents. Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that the plain language of the Torture Victim Protection Act naturally encompasses individuals who intentionally aid and abet torture, writing that statutory text permitting claims against those who “subject” victims to abuse includes parties providing material assistance. “Because the plain text of this statute includes individuals who aid and abet the victim’s torture, I would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on this score as well,” she wrote.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, joined in part by Justice Elena Kagan, agreed that narrowing aspects of the Alien Tort Statute’s scope might be appropriate but maintained that the Torture Victim Protection Act’s framework was sufficiently broad to reach parties providing knowing assistance to state-sponsored torture.
Business groups and corporate defense counsel welcomed the outcome, asserting that it eliminates a significant source of legal exposure for technology firms and multinational manufacturers operating across borders. Corporate defendants have spent decades defending sprawling class actions under the Alien Tort Statute, incurring substantial litigation expenses to respond to claims stemming from the sovereign conduct of foreign governments.
What This Means
The ruling reflects the court’s emphasis on the constitutional separation of powers and its conviction that recognizing new private causes of action represents an extraordinary legislative prerogative belonging exclusively to Congress. According to the majority, allowing unelected federal judges to recognize novel tort claims based on evolving international norms risks judicial encroachment on foreign policy—a domain the Constitution assigns to the executive and legislative branches.
The federal government’s Solicitor General had supported Cisco’s position during oral argument, warning that expansive extraterritorial litigation could disrupt diplomatic relations, invite reciprocal foreign lawsuits against American interests, and discourage American technological innovation abroad. The decision aligns with that position.
The decision marks a watershed moment in the decades-long conservative effort to restrict transnational human rights litigation in American courts. By establishing that foreign policy remedies must originate through congressional action rather than judge-made tort doctrine, the court has fundamentally reshaped the legal landscape for multinational companies facing overseas human rights claims and signaled its confidence that legislative bodies are better positioned to balance corporate interests against international accountability concerns.
