The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 Tuesday that foreign plaintiffs cannot use the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act to sue American companies for allegedly aiding human rights abuses abroad, sharply limiting the scope of federal courts over overseas corporate conduct.
The decision in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe marks a significant reversal for international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing for the conservative majority, held that federal judges lack the constitutional authority to create new private causes of action under the 1789 Alien Tort Statute and that the 1991 statute does not establish secondary aiding-and-abetting liability.
What Happened
The lawsuit originated from Falun Gong practitioners who alleged that San Jose-based Cisco Systems sold surveillance and networking equipment—part of China’s “Golden Shield” project—that enabled detention and torture by the Chinese government. A federal district court initially dismissed the complaint, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revived the claims, ruling that both statutes permitted aiding-and-abetting actions against domestic companies that knowingly facilitated violations of customary international law.
Barrett was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. “Today, we close the door that Sosa cracked and hold that courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms,” Barrett wrote, referencing the court’s 2004 precedent in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. “We also hold that the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which contains an express cause of action, does not provide for aiding-and-abetting liability.”
The Reaction
The Supreme Court’s position aligns with arguments presented by the federal government. The Solicitor General’s office had participated in oral argument supporting Cisco, urging the justices to rein in extraterritorial litigation that administration officials warned could disrupt foreign diplomacy and chill American technological innovation abroad. Business groups and defense counsel celebrated the decision, arguing that it removes a cloud of perpetual legal exposure for technology firms and global manufacturers operating in complex international markets.
The court’s three liberal justices voiced sharp disagreement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that statutory text permitting claims against individuals who “subject” victims to abuse naturally includes those who intentionally aid and abet the underlying conduct. “Because the plain text of this statute includes individuals who aid and abet the victim’s torture, I would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment on this score as well,” she wrote. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson agreed that narrowing aspects of the Alien Tort Statute’s scope was defensible but maintained that the Torture Victim Protection Act was sufficiently broad to reach parties providing material, knowing assistance to acts of state-sponsored torture. Justice Elena Kagan joined portions of the dissent.
What This Means
The ruling marks a significant shift in constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Barrett reasoned that creating private rights of action is a legislative prerogative reserved exclusively to Congress. Allowing unelected federal judges to recognize new tort claims based on evolving international norms risks judicial encroachment on foreign policy—a realm the Constitution assigns to the executive and legislative branches. Because the Alien Tort Statute is strictly a jurisdictional statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act’s text makes no mention of secondary liability, Cisco cannot be held liable under the theories presented.
The decision culminates decades of conservative judicial effort to curtail transnational human rights suits in U.S. courts, cementing the principle that foreign policy remedies must originate in Congress rather than through judge-made tort claims. The outcome likely narrows the pathway for future litigation by foreign victims seeking recourse from American corporations in domestic courts.
